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EXECUTIVE POWER IN WARTIME
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY DAVID SLOSS*
The topic for this panel is executive power in wartime. The central question the panelists
will address is whether the President, as commander in chief, has the constitutional power
to authorize violations of the international legal rules regulating the conduct of warfare Gus
in bello). There is no need for me to remind this audience about the timeliness of this topic.
In debating these issues, though, there is a risk that the discussion will become quite abstract.
So, before turning this over to our distinguished panelists, I wanted to give the audience a
concrete picture to ground the discussion.
On April 16, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved a set of twenty-four "counter-
resistance techniques" to be used for interrogations of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.' To the best of this author's knowledge, internal government documents regulating
the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq have not been publicly released. For the purposes of
the following hypothetical case, though, let us assume that the techniques approved for use
in Guantanamo were also approved for use in Iraq. One of the approved techniques is called
"fear up harsh." This technique does not involve any physical contact, but it does entail
the use of unspecified methods to "significantly increas[e] the fear level in a detainee." 2
Imagine that you are a U.S. soldier. You have just received orders to deploy to Iraq as
part of a military intelligence unit. Your unit has received explicit orders that authorize the
use of the twenty-four techniques approved by Secretary Rumsfeld. The time is fall 2003-
after the invasion of Iraq, but before the transfer of authority to the new Iraqi government.
Accordingly, the United States is an occupying power under the terms of the Fourth Geneva
Convention (the "Civilian Convention' ).3 During your military training, you were taught
that the Geneva Conventions are binding law, which you are required to obey. Based upon
your study of the Geneva Conventions, you know two things. First, all Iraqi nationals who
are detained by U.S. forces are protected under the Civilian Convention, unless they are
covered by one of the other three Geneva Conventions.4 Second, Article 31 of the Civilian
Convention states: "No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected
persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties."5 Clearly, the
use of "fear up harsh" goes well beyond what is permissible under Article 31.
For the U.S. soldier deployed in Iraq, I submit, the central question raised by this panel
is not merely of academic interest. If the President has the constitutional power to authorize
violations of the laws of war, then the soldier has a legal duty under domestic law to obey
his orders, notwithstanding the Geneva Conventions. (In theory, the soldier might incur
international criminal liability for following orders in these circumstances, but his actions
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Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the Commander, U.S. Southern Command (Apr.
16, 2003), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE RoAD To ABu GHRnAa 360 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005).
2 Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism (Apr. 4, 2003), reprinted
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 286, 340-41.
3 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilian Convention].
4 See Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290 ("Persons protected by
the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.").
5 Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. 31, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
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would be lawful under domestic law). If the President lacks the power to authorize violations
of the laws of war, then the soldier has a legal duty to comply with the Geneva Conventions,
despite contrary orders from his superiors, because the Conventions are the "Law of the
Land" under the Supremacy Clause. 6 Thus, U.S. soldiers deployed in Iraq have a pressing
need to know whether the President has the constitutional power to authorize violations of
the laws of war.
THE CINC AUTHORITY AND THE LAWS OF WAR
by Robert J. Delahunty*
The question of the President's constitutional authority as commander in chief (CINC) to
authorize violations of the rules of war came into sharp relief with the Justice Department's
release of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)'s August 1, 2002 memorandum addressing
the federal statutory prohibition against torture. Although neither the federal statutes nor the
Convention Against Torture (CAT) can strictly be regarded as rules of war (they apply in
peacetime as well), OLC staked out a position that bears directly on whether the President
as CINC may authorize violations of international rules of jus in bello. OLC issued a second
opinion on December 30, 2004, withdrawing its earlier memorandum and declining to opine
about the scope of the CINC authority on the grounds that "[c]onsideration of the bounds
of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive
that United States personnel not engage in torture." ' OLC's silence may reflect either an
appreciation of the difficulty of the issue or a merely prudential judgment about the current
political scene. As a near fifteen-year veteran of OLC who served there during the last three
administrations and who had no part in preparing either of the two memos in question, I
offer the following views on the bounds of the President's authority.
The most obvious starting-place might seem to be Justice Robert Jackson's famous tripartite
analysis in the Steel Seizure Case.2 If Jackson's analysis holds true, then it would seem that
the CINC would not have the constitutional authority to order violations of the torture statutes
(or, likely, of the CAT). For in ordering such actions, the President would be "tak[ing]
measures incompatible with the expressed ... will of Congress," with the result that "his
power [would be] at its lowest ebb. ' 3
Is the answer that simple? No. Jackson starts us out on the wrong foot. A sounder framework
is provided by the little-known opinion of an earlier and less eminent lawyer, Attorney
General Wickersham: an opinion dealing, not with so dramatic an event as the seizure of
the nation's steel industry, but with the mundane question of the location of a floating dry
dock.4
The question Wickersham considered was whether the Navy was legally required to locate
the dock at Algiers, Louisiana, when a statutory provision dictated that it be stationed there.
In Wickersham's view, the dock's location was subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Op. Off. Legal Counsel (Dec. 30,2004), available
at <http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/l8usc23402340a2.htm>.
2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
4 See Removal of Floating Dry Dock from Algiers, Louisiana, toGuantgnamo, Cuba, 28 Op. Att'yGen. 511 (1910).
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